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Global Justice: Just Another Modernisation Theory? 
Anne Phillips1 
Debates about global justice find little resonance amongst scholars in the postcolonial 
world.2  At one level, the reason is obvious: this is not their problem. The literature on global 
justice primarily concerns itself with the obligations of citizens and governments in the 
richer countries towards those in poorer ones. To put it more historically, it asks what those 
who are beneficiaries of colonialism and imperialism owe to those who were subjected to 
imperial power. The addressees are not those located in the post-colonies; nor are they the 
many millions who used to live there, but later migrated (or fled) to the imperial centres. It 
is, indeed, one of the oddities of the literature that it poses questions about global 
responsibility without always taking on board the nature of contemporary globalisation. In 
its pursuit of what ‘we’ owe to ‘distant others’,3 it treats the global north and south as 
relatively discrete and distant entities, overlooking the many ways in which the empire has 
come home.4 In asking whether principles of domestic egalitarian justice can or should be 
applied to the global realm,5 it presumes a separation that is already challenged by patterns 
of global migration. 
The lack of resonance is substantive as well as perspectival, for it also reflects a 
mismatch between the post-national, post-communal, post-ethnic framework of much 
global justice debate and the institutional legacies of colonial power. Global justice typically 
speaks to us as individuals, stressing our rights and obligations as human beings rather than 
as members of a community or citizens of a nation.  As Margaret Kohn notes, it is embedded 
within an analytic framework, usually either Kantian or utilitarian, that takes the moral 
obligations of the individual as its primary concern.6 States will of course figure in this: if the 
obligations are discharged, it will be mainly through state action, not as a result of individual 
citizens increasing their donations to development charities. But especially for the more 
cosmopolitan inclined theorists, the nation state is not the moral centre. They take issue, to 
the contrary, with state-centric understandings of responsibility and loyalty, elevating a 
normative universalism that conceives of us as in our persona as individual human beings 
over the (by implication) parochialism of the national community. In World Poverty and 
Human Rights, Thomas Pogge characterises cosmopolitanism as composed of three 
elements, the first of which is the view that ‘the ultimate units of concern are human 
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beings, or persons—rather than, say, family lines, tribes, ethnic, cultural, or religious 
communities, nations, or states. The latter may be units of concern only indirectly, in virtue 
of their individual members or citizens.’7 In Justice Beyond Borders, Simon Caney identifies 
three main challenges to global conceptions of justice – realism, nationalism, and ‘the 
society of states’ -  and sees all of these as characterised by the excess significance they 
attach to either state or nation.8 Most global justice theorists will attach primary normative 
weight to the individual.  
There are global justice theorists who regard nation states as ethically significant: 
Daniel Butt, for one, contrasts his approach to that of cosmopolitanism, and sees his work 
on Rectifying International Injustice as identifying the rectificatory duties of beneficiary 
states towards those they colonised or otherwise treated unjustly.9 Methodologically, 
however, Butt’s approach is strikingly similar to that of the more cosmopolitan theorists. In 
particular, he extrapolates the principles of justice that ought to regulate relations between 
nations from principles that ought to regulate relations between individuals;10 and he 
represents nations very much as agglomerations of individuals, referring to  ‘modern-day 
populations’ or ‘present day generations’ or  ‘overlapping generations’, as if there were no 
significant stratifications intervening between the individual and the state.11  Even, that is, 
where national boundaries are taken as ethically significant, and the post-national impetus 
is explicitly rejected, the framework remains fundamentally individualist.  
Other papers in this collection also draw attention to the methodological and 
normative individualism of much global justice theory. Samuel Moyn goes so far as to argue 
that the commitment to normative individualism was forged in resistance to the focus on 
state action and national self-determination that characterised the anti-colonial and 
immediately postcolonial movements.12 He argues that the global justice literature shares 
with the subsequent neo-liberal order an indifference to state autonomy, as did the human 
rights revolution, which focuses on the individual regardless of citizenship or location and 
tends, if anything, to consider nation states as the enemy. States then figure mainly as the 
abusers of human rights, and corrupt state officials are seen as contributing significantly (as 
indeed they do) to continuing inequalities. Kimberley Hutchings similarly draws attention to 
the methodological and normative individualism that pervades global justice theory, 
focusing, in her essay, on the subset of this that addresses the ethics of war. Here, the 
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methodological individualism is especially striking. Hutchings argues that the abstraction 
and individualism that characterises much writing on the ethics of war tends towards a 
colonial imaginary that locates moral intelligence and moral agency in the West.  
My own argument shares much common ground with these, and in particular with 
the implications of normative and methodological individualism. I focus on two aspects. The 
first is the mismatch between the assumptions and methodologies of global justice theory 
and what has been the typical experience of countries subjected to colonial rule: the 
absence, one might say, of a historical grounding. Colonialism destroyed communities and 
established historically arbitrary national boundaries, but it did not do so in order to usher 
in a world of abstract human beings. To the contrary, it largely secured and strengthened 
ethnic and religious boundaries, laying the basis for what Mahmood Mamdani has described 
as a ‘decentralized despotism.’13 The language of global justice neither speaks to nor offers 
much of a solution to the resulting institutionalisation of ethnic and community identity, for 
it operates within a post-national individualism that calls on us to go beyond the local 
towards the global, beyond the national towards the universal. Speaking, as it does, to 
readers in the global north, it calls on them ‘to disregard their private and local, including 
national, commitments and loyalties to give equal consideration to the needs and interests 
of every human being on this planet’.14 But other than reparations (and I do not dismiss the 
significance of these), it is unclear what this has to offer to readers in the global south.  
The first part of my argument addresses what might be described as sins of 
omission: a tendency to concentrate on some problems to the exclusion of others; to speak 
to some audiences but not others; a failure adequately to address the more burning issues 
for the global south. The global justice theorist might reasonably respond that no-one can 
do everything. My second claim is that this is not just something left undone, but a tendency 
that helps reproduce relations of power. When we are encouraged to think of what we owe 
to others as fellow humans, rather than as fellow citizens or fellow Europeans or fellow 
Igbo, this carries with it, however inadvertently, the suggestion that those who fail to make 
this normative move remain trapped within an older paradigm. The focus on a person-to-
person morality can then be said to reflect a modernist stance, in which the highest form of 
morality is the one that transcends the specificities of difference. Especially in its more 
cosmopolitan versions, global justice theory encourages us to view the power of local, 
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ethnic and community identification as an as-yet-untransformed traditional, something that 
holds us back from what justice really demands. In doing so, it suggests a trajectory from 
tradition to modernity of the kind more commonly associated with modernisation theory 
and its unthinking identification of modernity with the West.  
In what follows, I first draw on some of the literature on modernisation and 
modernity to clarify pitfalls in conceptions of the modern, and more specifically, to 
illuminate the role commonly allocated to the individual as emblem of modernity. I then 
turn to the legacy of colonialism, drawing particularly on sub-Saharan Africa, and use some 
of that legacy to challenge the traditional/modern dichotomy that suffuses modernisation 
theory. I then return to global justice theory.  I am not, in this essay, claiming an intellectual 
lineage that stretches from modernisation theory to contemporary work on global justice - 
though the genealogy Katrina Forrester excavates in her contribution to this collection 
might provide some support for this. My main point is less about historical influences and 
more about contemporary effects. I suggest that global justice expresses a modernist bias 
that mirrors some of the now discredited assumptions of modernisation theory.   
Modernity and Modernisation  
What is modernisation theory? I use the term to refer to a branch of development theory 
that thinks of societies as positioned along a continuum stretching from traditional to 
modern; defines the modern by reference to an (often idealised) version of Western society; 
and sees the ‘problem’ of development as a matter of overcoming the obstacles that 
tradition has set in its path. What counts as an obstacle varies from one version to another, 
as does the precise specification of traditional and modern,  and few modernisation 
theorists today would endorse  Walt Rostow’s over-formalised ‘five stages’ of economic and 
political growth.15 In most cases, however, there will be some variant of the distinction 
between ascription and achievement: some claim to the effect that ‘traditional‘ societies 
attribute status on the basis of family, kinship group, or caste, while ‘modern’ societies 
attribute status on the basis of achievement. In traditional societies, the story goes, the 
community is likely to take precedence over the individual; in modern societies, the 
individual takes precedence over the community. In traditional societies, there is no clear 
demarcation between economic, political and social power; in modern societies, there is a 
separation between these spheres. In early modernisation theory there was limited 
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nostalgia for the traditions that must be jettisoned in order to move along the route to 
development.16 Later writers, perhaps less confident about the virtues of modernity, have 
been more ambivalent, worrying that something valuable is lost in the process. The general 
character of the approach remains: a relatively unself-conscious differentiation between 
traditional and modern, with the latter modelled on the self-image (rather than reality) of 
Western societies; and a belief that all societies must eventually make their way along this 
path if they are to achieve economic growth, development, and democracy. Modernisation 
theory operates, that is, with what Dipesh Chakrabarty describes as a ‘transition 
narrative’:17 a ‘first in Europe, then elsewhere’ understanding of history that takes Europe 
and America as the model of all that is progressive and advanced, and presumes (at its more 
optimistic) that other countries must eventually arrive at the same destination, even if they 
get there by different routes. 
This way of viewing historical change is self-evidently vulnerable to criticism, and the 
death of modernisation theory has been repeatedly announced, from as early as 1976.18 In 
its fundamentals, however, it remains a major paradigm within the social sciences, and a 
number of commentators have noted its recent revival and reinvention.19 In 2005, to give 
one example, Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel published Modernization, Cultural 
Change, and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence, presenting a body of evidence 
to support what they took to be the central insight of modernisation theory: the claim that 
‘socioeconomic  development brings systemic changes in political, social, and cultural life’.20  
While they represent themselves as offering a revised modernisation theory, the revisions 
they propose are mainly concerned with challenging the excess determinism of earlier 
models. ‘Other things being equal’, they argue, ’socioeconomic development tends to make 
people more secular, tolerant, and trusting and to place more emphasis on self-expression, 
participation, and the quality of life. But socioeconomic factors are not the only significant 
influences’.21 So religion will not necessarily die out; cultural convergence is by no means 
guaranteed; and change is not unilinear. The revised version shares, however, with the 
classics a contrast between the communalism of traditional societies and individualism of 
modern ones, and differs mainly in insisting on the resilience and robustness of belief 
systems, even in periods of rapid socio-economic change. It remains vulnerable to the same 
kind of criticism that has been levelled at earlier versions. 
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One objection to modernisation theory is that it is bad history and bad sociology. It 
represents ‘traditional’ societies as if they have existed for centuries in splendid isolation, 
carrying on in their distinctively traditional ways, until propelled by the interventions of 
international agencies or processes of socio-economic development along the path towards 
modernity. In doing so, it treats social forms that were in large part produced by global 
interaction as if they were original conditions, understating the impact of centuries of global 
commerce, including the slave trade, and later of colonialism and neocolonialism. As critics 
have argued, societies at the raw end of global interactions are not so much undeveloped as 
actively underdeveloped, through the loss of their people and raw materials, the destruction 
of often thriving industries that were unable to compete with new imports, and the creation 
of new ‘traditions’ of hierarchy and authority that block further change.22 The binary of 
traditional and modern also misses the interweaving of the alleged alternatives in pretty 
much every known society. In the ascription/ achievement dichotomy, for example, it is 
supposed to be traditional societies that position people according to the group they are 
born into whilst modern societies judge us by what we have managed to do. This ignores 
both the importance of inherited privilege in so-called modern societies (think of Thomas 
Piketty’s analysis of the way inheritance patterns propel contemporary capitalism into 
deeper and deeper inequality23), and the continuing power of gender and race. The sex we 
are born into remains an enormously powerful determinant of status in so-called ‘modern’ 
societies, in ways that cannot be plausibly represented as an unfortunate hangover from a 
more disreputable past. The power of gender is better understood as constitutive of all 
known societies and something that is being continually reproduced.   
The further point is that adopting a binary of traditional and modern conveys a 
normative hierarchy that asserts the superiority of the latter. Though modernity is, at one 
level, a descriptive term, something we can attach to particular periods in history whilst 
leaving open for future examination its precise characteristics, it is most commonly 
normative as well, with the modern as what we aspire to and the traditional as what we 
seek to leave behind.  The binary then performs a hierarchy, and it has proved difficult to 
dislodge this even in a growing literature that detaches modernity from its more exclusively 
Euro-American form. Thomas McCarthy, for example, provides a careful critique of the racial 
hierarchies that have underpinned ideas of human development. He nonetheless ends with 
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certain ‘practically unavoidable presuppositions of contemporary discourse’, some of which 
hover uncomfortably close to presuppositions of modernisation theory.24 In his analysis, the 
‘facts of cultural and societal modernity’ bring with them the necessity of questioning 
received beliefs, inherited norms, and ascribed identities; encourage reflexivity and 
toleration of difference; and promote awareness of the possibilities for reasonable 
disagreement. Even when stripped of the presumption in favour of a European model, and 
moderated by explicit recognition of social and cultural diversity, this still recalls elements of 
the traditional/modern divide.25 
There are similar strains even in Chakrabarty’s account of Hindu reformers in late 
nineteenth/early twentieth century Bengal, reformers who had a strong sense of 
themselves as modern, drew in many ways on European narratives of modernity, but 
developed what he identifies as a distinctively Bengali version. In the European narratives, 
he argues, modernity came to be associated with the capacity to conceptualise individuals 
as abstracted from specific social context, and in their generalised and disembodied 
rationality, sustaining the emerging ideas of equality, autonomy, democracy, and nation. 
The history of Bengali nationalism, by contrast, offers ‘a colonial modernity that was 
intimately tied to European modernity but that did not reproduce the autonomous 
“individual” of European political thought as a figure of its own desire.’ 26  
Chakrabarty contrasts Lockean conceptions of the nation, in which an absolutist, 
paternally derived, power is replaced by a social contract between  equal (male) individuals, 
with the early Bengali understanding of national unity as an expression of ‘natural 
brotherhood’. (He is well aware that both versions exclude women.)  The power of the 
Bengali patriarch did not, he argues, have to be jettisoned in the same symbolic way in 
order to enter modernity, partly because his authority was not seen as exercised through 
command but via the devotion of his sons. Familial bonds could then continue to play a part 
in the theorisation of the ‘modern’ nation. So when, for example, Lord Curzon announced, 
in 1905, the first partition of Bengal to divide the largely Muslim areas in the east from the 
largely Hindu areas in the west, the movement protesting this ‘was rich in the symbolism of 
the country imagined as Mother and national unity as fraternal bond’.27 It was through the 
cultivation and widening of what was in some ways a very ‘traditional’ sentiment - the 
feeling of attachment to one’s brother –that a national sentiment could emerge. This makes 
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an illuminating contrast between different conceptions of modernity, but one point in 
Chakrabarty’s account troubles me, as indeed it troubled him. As he notes, the invocation of 
a national unity framed in terms of brotherhood was inadequate when faced with the 
central issue of Indian nationalism, which was how to achieve unity across the Hindu-
Muslim divide. Not surprisingly, ‘Muslims did not buy this largely Hindu, upper-caste 
rhetoric of natural brotherhood. Nor did the lower castes, as the twentieth century 
progressed.’28 He does not press this point, but one might well argue that the more abstract 
individual of Lockean modernity, however marked and constrained by exclusions of class, 
gender, and race, at least contained the potential to think beyond difference: to think of a 
unity in which it genuinely did not matter whether one was male or female, Hindu or 
Muslim, upper or lower caste. The figure of the abstract, autonomous individual continues 
to haunt notions of modernity even among those critical of its European focus.  
Legacies of colonialism 
Yet colonialism did little to promote this supposedly modern figure. To the contrary, one of 
its most cited legacies – at least in sub-Saharan Africa -  is that it rigidified what was 
previously more fluid, especially as regards ethnic and communal identities.29 There were 
moments, particularly in the early years, when advocates of colonial expansion imagined the 
newly acquired territories as a tabula rasa on which they could inscribe whatever they 
chose. In particular, they expected to be able to introduce the private markets in land and 
‘free’ wage labour that provide the economic underpinning of (what they deemed to be) 
modernity.  But while the colonial states enjoyed a monopoly of military force and deployed 
this with frequent brutality, they were nonetheless dependent on a layer of local notables 
to mobilise labour, collect taxes, and settle disputes. Whatever their ideological 
preferences, whether they formally espoused direct or indirect rule, administrators 
everywhere had to respond to what Mamdani describes as the ‘central and overriding 
dilemma: the native question. Briefly put, how can a tiny and foreign minority rule over an 
indigenous majority?’30 The answer, typically, was some version of indirect rule that 
selectively legitimised ‘customary law’ and ‘traditional authority’, picking out those 
elements that best served colonial imperatives and setting aside others. In British controlled 
West Africa, for example, the recalcitrance of local conditions, or all-too-fast uptake of new 
possibilities for private accumulation, soon encouraged a retreat to less ambitiously 
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transformative plans. Faced with processes they could not easily control, colonial 
administrators came to comfort themselves with a romanticised scenario of independent 
small-holders, cultivating their lands under conditions of customary land tenure, and 
protected by a combination of chiefly and colonial power against the rise of freehold land 
and its counterpart, free wage labour.31  For those who still toyed with more ambitious 
dreams of capitalist accumulation, reports of the horrific killings in the Belgian Congo 
provided a sharp reminder of the disruptions associated with plantation agriculture. It need 
hardly be added that the romanticised vision of the colonial settlement was not the full 
story, but it conveys something of the ways in which colonialism sustained its power.   
 In most parts of Africa, the administration of the colonies then came to depend on 
the delegation of authority to selected ‘tribal’ leaders (the uncooperative ones were quickly 
removed), who were secured in their power through their role as now state-endorsed 
custodians of the land, and enabled through this to determine who had access and under 
what conditions. In return, they ensured a steady supply of forced labour, taxes, military 
recruits, and agricultural commodities. Their role as custodians was commonly referred to 
as reflecting a system of customary land tenure, as if it simply formalised practices from 
before the colonial conquest, but the authority granted to the newly recognised tribal 
authorities usually exceeded that of their predecessors. As Mamdani puts it, ‘from African 
tradition, colonial powers salvaged a widespread and time-honored practice, one of a 
decentralized exercise of power, but freed that power of restraint, of peers or people. Thus 
they laid the basis for a decentralized despotism.’ 32 The chiefs and local notables became 
more unrestrained in their authority, but also the fixing of boundaries between one 
community and another, and attachment of these to what was seen as tribal difference, 
made it harder for those not deemed to share the same ethnicity to move across the 
territories and gain access to new land.33 The winning of independence made less of a 
difference here than might have been hoped, for postcolonial rulers faced much the same 
constraints as regards their administrative capacity and the reach of their authority, and 
frequently incorporated these neocustomary authorities into their structures of governance. 
In Catherine Boone’s analysis,  ‘chiefs and other neocustomary leaders often remained the 
gatekeepers, political brokers, and  local strongmen they had been under colonial rule, 
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mediating local citizens’ access to land and local justice, and brokering access to 
opportunities (and exposure to risks) posed by government.’34  
One important consequence was the ethnicisation of land conflict. ‘Across much of 
rural Africa, the definition of “who is a stranger” and the second-class status of strangers 
tended to harden over time,’35 and this has proved particularly damaging at a time of 
increasing population pressure on the land. A further important consequence has been the 
strengthening of traditional authorities who then resist the rights of women to inherit the 
land or exercise power. Pre-colonial Africa was no matriarchal haven, but women had 
assumed important positions of leadership in some of the ancient empires of the continent, 
and as the example of the Queen Mothers of West Africa illustrates, had continued to 
exercise significant authority well into the colonial period. At a more decentralised level, 
‘most African societies had women’s organisations which controlled or organised 
agricultural work, trade, the markets, and women’s culture and its relevant ideology’; 36 
again, the market women of West Africa are a significant illustration. But while the colonial 
regimes employed, and in many instances magnified, the authority of male chiefs, they had 
no place in their conception of colonial rule for these forms of female power. Colonialism 
did little for women’s rights, and nothing of significance as regards their rights to the land: 
again, this was not the world of private property and individual rights that some earlier 
exponents of imperialism’s transformative power had anticipated.  
Karuna Mantena has traced the ways these developments played out in imperial 
thinking within the metropolis – in her study, particularly within Britain - and identifies the 
Indian Mutiny of 1857 and Governor Eyre’s brutal suppression of the Morant Bay rebellion 
in Jamaica in 1865 as key moments in the shift.37 What was once justified by reference to 
the ‘civilising mission’ and the capacity to bring ‘backward’ natives to a higher stage of 
civilization, came to be thought of more as a matter of maintaining order over peoples who 
were fundamentally different.  ‘In the transition from universalist civilizing justification to 
culturalist alibis for the maintenance of empire, social order and stability supplanted 
agendas of reform as the motivating ground of imperial rule.’ 38 Or as Mamdani similarly 
puts it, there was a ‘midstream shift in perspective: from the zeal of a civilizing mission to a 
calculated preoccupation with holding power; from being the torchbearers of individual 
freedom to being custodians protecting the customary integrity of dominated tribes’.39  
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  With the ‘turn to culture’, those colonial subjects who had too willingly imbibed the 
lessons of Western civilization now became objects of disdain. The colonial administrators 
who most explicitly positioned themselves as defenders of what they conceived to be 
custom and tradition much preferred the dignified difference of traditional rulers to the 
now despised products of the missionary schools, with their ties and their umbrellas. 
Mantena cites Lord Lugard’s disdain for the ‘unstable’, ‘untrustworthy’, Europeanized 
African as one example of this.40 Joyce Cary provides another in his description of a District 
Officer in the novel Mister Johnson.  
His expression is mild and benign, but the truth is that he 
dislikes all Negro clerks and especially Johnson. He is a deeply 
sentimental man, a conservative nature. He likes all old things in 
their old places and he dreads all change, all innovation. To his 
mind, a messenger in a white gown, even if he speaks and 
writes English, is a gentleman; but a clerk in trousers, even if he 
can barely do either, is an upstart, dangerous to the established 
order of things.41  
In colonial ideology, racial hierarchy often appeared in the guise of racial difference, with 
each regarded as worthy so long as he remained in his own place. But of course both the 
English-speaking messenger in the white gown and the upstart Christianised clerk in 
trousers were alike products of the colonial conquest; the former was no more 
representative of the old ways than the latter was representative of the new ones.  
Global Justice Theory  
How might any of this relate to questions of global justice? First, a caveat: it would not be 
entirely fair to say of global justice theory that it ignores historical causation. This might be a 
reasonable criticism as regards Peter Singer’s drowning child scenario, which explicitly sets 
to one side whether the person under a moral obligation to rescue the child had any causal 
role in her ending up in the pond, and by extension, sets to one side whether those now 
called upon to address global poverty had any role in creating it.42 It would be less 
convincing as applied, say, to Pogge, who argues that ‘existing peoples have arrived at their 
present levels of social, economic, and cultural development through a historical process 
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that was pervaded by enslavement, colonialism, even genocide’, and that ‘the global 
economic order plays a major role in the persistence of severe poverty worldwide’.43 Here, 
the case for global redistribution is directly linked to an account of richer countries as 
historically responsible for the poverty of poorer ones. Environmental degradation, 
malnutrition, and starvation are traced to a global economy that continues to channel 
resources to people elsewhere.  
One could not say, of this, that it treats what was produced by colonialism as if it 
were an original state. The perspective, however, remains very much that of the richer 
countries, and the references to colonialism work primarily to put pressure on the citizens 
and governments of these countries to recognise their responsibilities for global injustice 
and take remedial action. The key message is that justice cannot be contained within the 
narrow confines of the nation-state, and one effect of this is to render the specificities of 
each national context –including the specificities of each postcolonial context - as of lesser 
significance. Consider the two standard objections to global justice. These are, first, that 
people have compelling local attachments to their fellow citizens; secondly, that the 
problems of global poverty stem more from domestic failings, like corrupt elites, than from 
the workings of the global economy. Answering the first typically involves challenging the 
normative priority given to the nation state by citizens in the rich countries. Answering the 
second involves challenging the analytic priority given to the nation state within the 
postcolonial ones. On the first argument, we should not think the obligation to deliver 
justice stops at the border of the rich countries. On the second, we should not think the 
causes of injustice arise within the borders of the poor ones. Both responses push in the 
post-national, post-communal, post-ethnic direction that modernisation theory identifies as 
at the ‘modern’ rather than ‘traditional’ end of the spectrum.  
The paradigm encourages us to bracket what goes on inside each country and treat it 
as both normatively and analytically of lesser importance. The history of colonialism then 
figures mainly as confirming the case for reparations, as demonstrating the responsibility of 
the richer countries and their obligations to the poorer ones. This is an important message: I 
am not arguing against reparations. But an exclusive focus on colonial wrongs is not always 
the most productive message for those living in the post-colonies. As the example of 
Zimbabwe under (the later) Mugabe suggests, the story of colonial depredations can 
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become an alibi for governments unwilling to address the impact of their own policies, and 
refusing to acknowledge their own plundering of their citizens. Because it concentrates on 
global responsibility, global justice theory is inclined to gloss over more local causes of 
injustice. Because it focuses on person to person relations, it is inclined to ignore what 
happens at the level of the state. The normative framing encourages us to think primarily in 
terms of the global rich and global poor, abstract conglomerates of abstract individuals, 
identifiable mainly by location (global north or global south) and resources. This is not a 
particularly illuminating framework for addressing the political and economic structures that 
sustain inequality. Among other things, it means that those who continue to devote their 
energies to critical analysis of the aid relationship or the failings of postcolonial elites may 
be left feeling they are undermining the normative case for global justice, and providing too 
easy an escape route for those seeking to evade their responsibilities. Yet for those living in 
the post-colonies, analysis of these political and economic structures, local as well as global, 
might seem the most pressing task.  
This is one potential failing of the global justice approach, but does not yet link it 
decisively to modernisation theory. The latter, after all, tends to focus quite closely on local 
structures and the obstacles these present to further development, and on that score is 
better understood as the target of much global justice theory rather than its ally. The two 
approaches nonetheless have a shared investment in a modernist mentality that regards the 
transcendence of difference as representing morality’s highest stage. For modernisation 
theorists, including of the revised kind, development involves a transition from the closed 
communities of traditional society to the open-ended individualism of modern society: 
modernity is then understood as post national, post communal, post ethnic.  Global justice 
theorists do not talk in the same way about development, but they operate with an 
understanding of normative maturity that involves a similar trajectory: we move beyond the 
local attachments that conceive of obligation as ending at the boundary of community or 
nation, and come to appreciate that justice is a global affair. There is no explicit theory of 
transition in this, and no endorsement of the language of tradition and modernity, but there 
is a related confidence about what counts as the higher stage. ‘We’ (in the richer countries) 
are not only represented as those with the obligations. We are also implicitly represented as 
those more capable of responding to the normative call to deliver global justice, because 
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the centrality we already attach to the individual enables us to get beyond the limitations of 
either a statist or localist perspective.  
In a critique of Pogge, Neera Chandhoke has argued that tying the obligation to 
remedy to the causal role one has played in creating the problem can limit rather than 
expand the scope of the obligation, and that those who can alleviate global poverty have an 
obligation to do so even if they are not institutionally connected in a causal chain. 44 Her 
argument is not just that the rich in the rich countries should not be able to get themselves 
off the hook by showing that they were not responsible for all the poverty in the world. She 
wants also to stress the obligations of the rich in the poorer countries, and argues that in 
failing to emphasise or include these, global justice theorists implicitly rate the inhabitants 
of poorer countries as of lesser moral status, as recipients of other people’s actions rather 
than actors themselves. ‘Are we,’ she asks, ‘who live and work in the developing world, 
fated to remain consumers of acts, whether these are acts of harm or of duty, performed by 
the West? Do those of us who live in India have any kind of duty to the poor in other 
countries? And if we do not, do we lack status as moral beings who count?’45 The worry, 
that is, is that in addressing itself so exclusively to the citizens of rich countries, global 
justice theory not only treats them as causally responsible and richer in resources, but 
perceives them as richer in agency too. My suggestion is that this is not just a perverse 
consequence of first world guilt. Insofar as the capacity for ethical action is being associated 
with the capacity to think beyond the local to the global, or beyond the national to the 
rights and obligations of the individual, it both blocks analysis of the structures sustaining 
inequality and conveys a normative hierarchy.  
One element of this is that appealing ‘beyond’ difference to what then becomes an 
excessively abstract humanity threatens to deprive us of the collective resources on which 
mobilisations against injustice often depend.  When people defend a local community 
against the power of global corporations (think of the Movement for the Survival of the 
Ogoni People against the power of Shell and the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation), 
they rarely do so in a post-national, post-communal, post-ethnic framework. To the 
contrary, they often appeal to the values of their community, to principles of fairness or 
mutual concern they see as being swept aside by the juggernauts of modernity. There is 
typically some romanticisation of the past in this: the past, like the present, is always a 
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mixture of good and bad, and nostalgia for tradition commonly obscures its less attractive 
aspects. But as a mobilising force, references to earlier but now threatened values are often 
more powerful than the abstract invocation of a common humanity. And there are good 
reasons for this, for one of the risks in invoking our common humanity is that this can 
encourage us to think of our humanness as distinct from the specificities that characterise 
us: to think of it as a kind of transcendence, an ability to set aside the particularities, those 
supposedly less essential aspects of ourselves. We do, indeed, need to make connections 
with those we perceive as different from ourselves – this is the important truth in appeals to 
our common humanity -  but this does not (and cannot) require transcendence of all 
difference.   When connecting across difference is presented as a matter of refusing to 
attach significance to that difference, this discourages analysis of the structures that 
continue to turn that difference into inequality.  It also encourages the view that difference 
per se is a problem, something we need mentally to erase in order to embrace that 
commonality. Against this view, it is important to stress that we are not human instead of 
but as …women, men, black, white, gay, lesbian, heterosexual, Fante, Hausa, Igbo. These are 
not exclusive alternatives, though they are too often presented as such within the 
framework of a methodological or normative individualism.  
There is a particularly compelling articulation of this point in a speech Hannah 
Arendt gave on the occasion of receiving the Lessing Prize in 1959. This was her first return 
to Germany since being obliged to leave the country in 1933, and she used the occasion to 
reflect critically on the notion of the human and invocations of our common humanity, and 
how little these supposedly inclusive ideals had been able to achieve in those ‘dark times’. 
When Jewishness carried such life and death significance, she saw it as evasion simply to 
insist on a shared humanity.  
‘(I)n the case of a friendship between a German and a Jew under the conditions of 
the Third Reich it would scarcely have been a sign of humanness for the friends to 
have said: Are we not both human beings? It would have been mere evasion of 
reality and of the world common to both at that time; they would not have been 
resisting the world as it was. A law that prohibited the intercourse of Jews and 
Germans could be evaded but could not be defied by people who denied the reality 
of the distinction. In keeping with a humanness that had not lost the solid ground of 
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reality, a humanness in the midst of the reality of persecution, they would have had 
to say to each other: A German and a Jew, and friends.’46  
The parallel context, for much of the previously colonised world, is an institutionalisation of 
ethnic and community identity that cannot be defied by people who simply deny the reality 
of the distinctions. In Africa today, it is of course possible to refuse the identifications, to 
espouse a cosmopolitan humanism that attaches no significance to them. But this would be 
a matter of individual stance or attitude, and of itself hardly begins the work of dismantling 
the structures that can make those ethnic and community identifications so lethal. The 
effect, moreover, is very often to institute a new kind of hierarchy, through which the 
progressive-minded and usually urban dweller marks his distance from the benighted rural 
population.47 The modern, again, becomes associated with the capacity to think of oneself 
as abstracted from social context, to question received beliefs, inherited norms, or ascribed 
identities; and the capacity to do this becomes elevated into the mark of normative 
maturity.  
To clarify, I am not arguing against attaching normative weight to individuals; I am 
not seeking to defend tradition against modernity; I am not even arguing for a more 
communitarian understanding of the individual, though I will happily settle for a more 
relational one. As I hope has become clear, I see contrasts between traditional and modern, 
revolving as they so often do around further contrasts between particularity and 
universality, or embeddedness in one’s social relations and the capacity for abstracting 
oneself from these, as obscuring the interweaving of the so-called traditional and so-called 
modern in pretty much every known society. More specifically, my comments on the 
legacies of colonialism are intended to convey scepticism about what gets named as 
‘tradition’ in societies that were subjected to the upheavals of colonial rule. I am not then 
endorsing the kind of cultural revivalism that uncritically reclaims those past traditions as 
alternatives for the future.48 My claim, more simply, is that a normative theory that revolves 
around the abstraction of the individual – and the capacity of that individual to abstract 
herself from her surroundings -  participates, however inadvertently, in a binary of 
traditional and modern.  
Global justice theory enacts its modernity by refusing the significance of substantive 
characteristics beyond location (X lives in the global north not south) or resources (X is rich 
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rather than poor). This simultaneously obscures the structures that sustain inequality - 
structures that are local as well as global - and endorses an ethical framework that calls on 
us to set aside local and national loyalties. This is not particularly meant for those living in 
the post-colonies, on the (often reasonable) grounds that they are the ones who were 
wronged, not the ones with the duties of justice. My point is that it could not be addressed 
to them, for an exhortation to set aside the private, local, and communal, and disregard 
national commitments and concerns is too patently at odds with the challenges people face 
in the worlds created through the colonial encounters. Global justice claims to address us all 
in our shared humanity, but in reality speaks only to some, and in doing so becomes 
vulnerable to the charge of dividing the world into an ‘us’ and ‘them’. The ‘us’ are figured as 
having arrived at the stage where they can at last set aside local loyalties while the ‘them’ 
are not really figured at all.  
One might, of course, argue that it is precisely in contexts where there is an excess of 
attachment to the ethnic or local that global justice theory comes into its own: that its great 
strength lies in the resources it offers for challenging ethnic, gender and national exclusions. 
There is something in this, but not enough. As critics of race-blind and gender-blind 
approaches to inequality have repeatedly argued (including, in this volume, Charles Mills), 
while the high-minded refusal to regard differences of gender, ethnicity or nationality can, 
in some contexts, alleviate discrimination, it can also close down analysis of the structures 
that reproduce the inequalities and discrimination, and block initiatives for change. The 
challenge is to find ways of mobilising the ethical imperative that underpins global justice 
theory without obscuring the history in which it is embedded: to find ways of pursuing 
justice that do not rebound on themselves by enacting a normative hierarchy. 
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